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Abstract
Strategic delegation to an independent regulator with a pure consumer standard improves dy-
namic regulation by mitigating ratchet effects associated with short term contracting. A consumer
standard alleviates the regulator’s myopic temptation to raise output after learning the firm is
inefficient. Anticipating this tougher regulatory behavior, efficient firms find cost exaggeration less
attractive. This reduces the need for long term rents and mitigates ratchet effects. The regulator’s
welfare standard biased towards consumers comes, however, at the cost of some allocative distor-
tion from the genuine social welfare perspective. Hence, a trade-off results which favors strategic
delegation when efficient firms are relatively likely.
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1 Introduction
We investigate the scope for strategic delegation to an independent regulatory agency in a dynamic
regulatory framework with ratchet effects due to short term contracting. We show that establishing
a regulator with a pure consumer standard, which places more emphasis on the firm’s rent extraction
than the genuine social welfare function, acts as a strategic device that mitigates ratchet effects.
Hence, tougher regulators on firms improve the dynamic efficiency of short term regulatory contracts.
In contrast, we do not find any beneficial strategic delegation effect of more lenient regulators.
Our results are consistent with the mandate of modern independent regulatory agencies that focus
their attention on consumers, while downplaying the role of profits. For example, Section 2A of the
UK Water Industry Act 1991 states that the Water Services Regulation Authority “shall exercise
and perform the powers [...] to further the consumer objective”, while mentioning with regard to
firm profits that the Authority’s duty is “to secure that companies [...] are able [...] to finance the
proper carrying out of those functions”. Consequently, profits are viewed only as an indirect mean
for regulators to achieve their primary goal of serving consumers. Similarly, Ofgem, the UK Office
of the Gas and Electricity Markets, states that “protecting consumers is our first priority”, clarifying
further that the “Authority’s principal objective is to protect the interests of existing and future
consumers”.1 Likewise, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in the US bluntly states on its
website: “Mission: Reliable, Efficient and Sustainable Energy for Customers”.2
Prima facie, the result that a tougher regulator mitigates ratchet effects seems counterintuitive,
because economic theory associates the ratchet problem primarily with the inability of decision makers
to hand out long term rents. Indeed, this inability suggests that if strategic delegation is beneficial,
then only via a regulator that is less inclined to extract rents. This reasoning would lead to the
opposite conclusion that regulation should be more lenient towards the firm. Our analysis shows that
this intuition is misleading. Rather than restoring the regulator’s ability to hand out long term rents,
it is preferable to mitigate the ratchet problem by ensuring that the regulator chooses output schedules
that reduce the need for long term rents. This leads to the result that tougher regulators improve the
dynamics of regulation.
We demonstrate our results in a two-period version of the seminal Baron and Myerson (1982)
monopoly regulation model, where a firm has private information about its time invariant marginal
costs. A fundamental insight of the Baron and Myerson model is that the firm’s private information
1Quotes with emphasis added are taken directly from Ofgem’s website http://www.ofgem.gov.uk.
2See http://www.ferc.gov/about/about.asp.
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leads the regulator to trade off allocative efficiency against rent extraction. The reason why tougher
regulation helps to mitigate ratchet effects is directly related to this fundamental trade-off. Whereas
a regulator with full commitment powers can optimally commit to an ex post inefficiently low output
of the inefficient firm, a regulator who can only use short term contracts succumbs to the temptation
to raise the output of the inefficient firm after learning private information. This myopic regulatory
behavior triggers the ratchet problem, since the efficient firm anticipates higher rents from cost ex-
aggeration. A consumer surplus mandate that puts more emphasis on rent extraction alleviates the
regulator’s myopic temptation to raise output. This reduces the need for long term rents to the effi-
cient firm and thereby mitigates ratchet effects. The benefit comes, however, at the cost of a further
output distortion for the inefficient firm, in comparison to the genuine social welfare function. Hence,
a trade-off results, which shifts in favor of strategic delegation with the likelihood of the efficient
firm. Strategic delegation is therefore optimal when the efficient firm is relatively likely. Otherwise, a
regulator with an unbiased welfare perspective is preferable.
A second contribution of our paper is to show that a repeated version of the Baron and Myer-
son model allows a full characterization of the optimal dynamic regulatory contract in the presence
of limited commitment. Laffont and Tirole (1987, 1993) emphasize the difficulties in obtaining ex-
plicit results within their framework even with two cost types, and they resort to simulations when
investigating the ratchet effect. Although the analytical tractability within the Baron and Myerson
framework is higher, it still limits us to demonstrate our results with only two cost types.3 Never-
theless, the intuition gleaned from the two-type model identifies the general principles underlying our
results. Hence, our stylized formulation puts sufficient structure on the problem to derive analytical
results, while still being rich enough to describe the relevant effects of short term contracting.
Economic literature has recognized the relevance of strategic delegation for a long time. The semi-
nal papers of Vickers (1985), Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), and Sklivas (1987) show
that a firm’s profit-maximizer owner may prefer to distort managerial incentives via a remuneration
which is proportional to a (linear) combination of profits and output. More recently, Jansen et al.
(2007) find similar results with managerial rewards based on a weighted sum of profits and market
share.
Strategic delegation is particularly important in the presence of time inconsistency problems. Ro-
goff (1985) demonstrates that policy makers can benefit from a central banker whose mandate departs
3In a Baron and Myerson framework with two types and no commitment, Drugov (2010) also obtains analytical
results. Since in his model production takes place at most once, the commitment problem however does not lead to
ratchet effects. He points out that tractability is also lost in his setting with a continuum of types (p. 600).
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from social welfare and places a too large weight on controlling inflation relative to unemployment. In
an environmental regulation framework, Spulber and Besanko (1992) find that a regulatory mandate
which assigns a different profit weight from policy makers’ preferences is optimal when the agency
cannot make a credible commitment to enforce a particular regulatory standard. The direction of
distortion crucially depends on whether the actions of the regulator and the firm are profit substitutes
or complements. In a companion paper (1993), Besanko and Spulber examine a model of merger
policy where the antitrust authority cannot commit to a challenge rule before a merger is proposed.
As a result, in the presence of asymmetric information about cost savings from merger, the authority
does not internalize the impact that a variation in the challenge rule has on merger self-selection. This
yields a more lenient antitrust policy which approves merger proposals with a too high probability. A
greater weight on consumer surplus in the welfare standard increases the likelihood of challenge and
thereby improves social welfare.4
In line with this strand of literature, we investigate strategic delegation as a commitment device to
cope with time inconsistency problems. However, differently from previous work, our focus is on the
benefits of strategic delegation to mitigate ratchet effects, which the regulation literature considers as
a one of the major practical problems in dynamic regulation (e.g., Newbery 1999). Laffont and Tirole
(1987, 1988, 1993) clarify that ratchet effects obtain only in the presence of limited commitment. In
a two-period version of the Laffont and Tirole (1986) model with time invariant private information,
they show that a regulator with full commitment powers finds it optimal to commit not to exploit the
information revealed by the firm in earlier periods. If however only short term contracting is feasible,
the regulator succumbs to this temptation and therefore a ratchet problem arises. This makes a
separating contract more costly, and even unfeasible with a continuum of firm’s types.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model which allows us to
demonstrate our results analytically. Section 3 studies the regulator’s behavior for a given regulatory
mandate. Section 4 explores the scope for strategic delegation and shows that a pure consumer
4Baron (1988) shows that if there is a strong electoral connection between the benefits delivered to constituents and
their electoral support, the legislature will choose a welfare standard which assigns a greater weight to consumer surplus
than firm profits.
5Short term contracting is not the only form of limited commitment investigated in the literature on optimal regulation
(for a review on this topic, we refer to Armstrong and Sappington 2007). In a companion paper (1990), Laffont and
Tirole assume that the regulator can offer the firm a long term contract but both parties may renegotiate the original
contract if they agree to do so. Renegotiation presumes that the regulator can credibly promise to deliver future rents to
the firm but cannot commit to a specific policy that generates these rents. Baron and Besanko (1987) inquire a different
form of limited commitment, labeled as “fairness”, which requires the firm to fulfill the terms of future policies if they
are “fair” in the light of the information disclosed in earlier periods.
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standard is optimal when the efficient firm is relatively likely, otherwise there is no room for strategic
delegation. Section 5 concludes. All relevant proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider a regulated monopolistic firm that can provide a public service with consumer value S
in each of two periods τ = 1, 2. We weight the first period with 1 and the second period with ρ > 1.
The different weighting reflects differences in the length of periods and the number of consumers.6
The firm incurs time invariant unit costs ci for each period it provides the service. With probability
ν ∈ (0, 1) costs are cl and with probability 1 − ν costs are ch, where ∆c ≡ ch − cl > 0. The cost
realization is the firm’s private information. Fixed costs are normalized to zero. We assume S > ch
so that production is also efficient with high costs.
Given a transfer tτ ∈ R and (a probability of) production qτ ∈ [0, 1] in period τ , the profit of a
firm with costs ci is Πτi = tτ − ciqτ , while consumer surplus is Ψτ = Sqτ − tτ . We consider a Congress
with a social welfare function consisting of a weighted sum of consumer surplus and firm’s profits.
Congress’ objective in period τ when facing a firm with costs ci is
Wτi = Ψτ + αcΠτi = Sqτ − tτ + αc(tτ − ciqτ ),
where αc ∈ [0, 1] is a weight on the firm’s profits. Congress’ greater concern with consumer surplus
than shareholders’ rents typically reflects distributional issues or a partial foreign ownership of the
firm. Congress’ aggregate welfare is the sum over the first and second period:
Wi = W1i + ρW2i. (1)
In line with the regulation literature, Congress does not engage directly in regulation and thus
assigns a regulator the mandate to regulate the firm. The regulator lacks the commitment power
to offer the firm a long term regulatory contract that covers both periods. Instead, only short term
contracting is feasible. The regulatory mandate is to maximize each period τ a weighted sum of
consumer surplus and firm’s profits, which may diverge from Congress’ preferences:
Vτi = Ψτ + αrΠτi = Sqτ − tτ + αr(tτ − ciqτ ),
where αr ∈ [0, 1] is the weight the regulator assigns to profits.
7
6We focus on the case ρ > 1 for expositional reasons. Appendix 2 extends our model to the case ρ ≤ 1. This
complicates the analysis by increasing the number of case distinctions, but does not affect our qualitative results.
7Hence, we implicitly assume that, due to practical concerns, the weight αr is time invariant.
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Our main question is whether Congress finds it optimal to appoint a regulator with different
preferences, namely, with a profit weight αr which diverges from αc. The regulator’s aggregate payoff
is the sum over the first and second period:
Vi = V1i + ρV2i. (2)
In summary, we consider the following sequence of events. First, Congress sets the regulatory
mandate αr ∈ [0, 1]. Second, the firm privately learns its cost type ci ∈ {cl, ch}. Third, the regulator
regulates the firm for two periods. In order to distinguish between the three players, we refer to
Congress as “she”, the regulator as “he”, and the firm as “it”.
3 The regulation game
We start our analysis by considering the regulation game between the regulator and firm for some
given weight αr. Before solving the dynamic regulatory problem, it is helpful to derive the optimal
regulatory schedule for the one-period static problem.
3.1 Static regulation contracts
By the revelation principle (e.g., Myerson 1979), the optimal static contract is a direct menu {γl, γh} =
{(ql, tl), (qh, th)} that maximizes the regulator’s objective under the firm’s participation and incentive
constraints:
max
ql,tl,qh,th
ν[Sql − tl + αr(tl − clql)] + (1− ν)[Sqh − th + αr(th − chqh)]
s.t. tl − clql ≥ 0; th − chqh ≥ 0
tl − clql ≥ th − clqh; th − chqh ≥ tl − chql.
Standard arguments show that the participation constraint of the inefficient firm and the incentive
constraint of the efficient firm are binding at the optimal contract. Substituting them out, the problem
simplifies to
max
ql,qh
ν[(S − cl)ql − (1− αr)∆cqh] + (1− ν)(S − ch)qh. (3)
Defining a cutoff value ν as
ν ≡
S − ch
S − ch + (1− αr)∆c
,
we can fully characterize the optimal static mechanism in the following lemma.
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Lemma 1 (static optimal regulation) The optimal static regulatory policy depends on the likeli-
hood of the efficient firm, ν ∈ (0, 1), as follows:
i) For ν < ν¯ it exhibits (ql, tl) = (qh, th) = (1, ch).
ii) For ν ≥ ν¯ it exhibits (ql, tl) = (1, cl) and (qh, th) = (0, 0).
Underlying the regulation problem is the familiar trade-off between allocative efficiency and rent
extraction. For the pessimistic case, ν < ν¯, where the efficient firm is relatively unlikely, a pooling
contract with ql = qh = 1 is optimal. It ensures an informational rent ∆c to the efficient firm, and
yields the regulator Vl = S − cl − (1− αr)∆c when facing costs cl and Vh = S − ch when facing costs
ch. For the optimistic case, ν ≥ ν¯, the optimal mechanism is a separating contract with ql = 1 and
qh = 0. It leaves no informational rents, and yields the regulator Vl = S − cl when facing costs cl
and Vh = 0 when facing costs ch. Hence, a pooling contract entails an efficient allocation at the cost
of informational rents to the efficient firm, which is optimal when this firm’s type is relative unlikely.
Conversely, a separating contract extracts all informational rents but shuts down the production of
the inefficient firm. This is optimal when the efficient firm is relatively likely.
3.2 Dynamic regulation with long term contracting
In the two-period regulation problem with full commitment, the revelation principle still applies so
that it is optimal for the regulator to offer the firm an incentive compatible menu of two long term
contracts γl = {(q1l, t1l), (q2l, t2l)} and γh = {(q1h, t1h) , (q2h, t2h)}. In principle, each contract might
specify different allocations over the two periods. However, it is well established in the literature
(Baron and Besanko 1984; Laffont and Tirole 1993) that, with time invariant costs, the regulator’s
optimal long term contract is a straightforward repetition of the optimal static contract.
Lemma 2 (optimal regulation with long term contracting) The optimal two-period regulatory
policy with long term contracting depends on the likelihood of the efficient firm, ν ∈ (0, 1), as follows:
i) For ν < ν¯ it exhibits (q1l, t1l) = (q1h, t1h) = (q2l, t2l) = (q2h, t2h) = (1, ch).
ii) For ν ≥ ν¯ it exhibits (q1l, t1l) = (q2l, t2l) = (1, cl) and (q1h, t1h) = (q2h, t2h) = (0, 0).
3.3 Dynamic regulation with short term contracting
We next address the regulation problem when the regulator cannot commit to long term contracts
and only short term contracting is feasible. Laffont and Tirole (1987, 1988, 1993) emphasize that
in dynamic regulatory settings with short term contracts, the standard revelation principle does not
apply anymore. In particular, the regulator may do better if he uses contracts that do not induce
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the firm to reveal its type truthfully. Bester and Strausz (2001) provide an appropriate adaptation
of the revelation principle. They show that, despite a lack of commitment, the mechanism designer
still optimally uses a direct mechanism under which truthful revelation is an optimal strategy for the
agent but the latter does not necessarily use this strategy with probability one.
For our setup, this means that, in line with the standard revelation principle, we can restrict
attention to first period menus where the regulator offers only two contracts γ1l = (q1l, t1l) and
γ1h = (q1h, t1h). However, going beyond the standard revelation principle, we also have to consider
explicitly the possibility that the firm randomizes between the two contract offers. Of course, in
equilibrium, any active randomization must be an optimal behavioral strategy of the firm. Let βi be
the probability that a firm of type ci picks the contract γ1i. By appropriate labeling contracts, we
can always ensure that βl + βh ≥ 1. Since labeling implies that the type ci is more likely to select the
contract γ1i than the other type cj , we can interpret γ1i as the contract targeted at ci rather than at
cj . Moreover, we can focus on pairs (βl, βh) with βl > 0 and βh > 0.
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Given a first period menu {γ1l, γ1h}, let ν2i ≡ Pr{ci = cl|γ1i} denote the regulator’s updated
beliefs that the firm’s type is ci after the contract γ1i has been chosen in the first period. With
these posterior beliefs, the regulator offers the firm a new contract in the second period. This is the
final period, and thereby the standard revelation principle applies, which ensures that we can restrict
attention to direct incentive compatible mechanisms. Since they may depend on the firm’s menu
choice in the first period, let {γ2il, γ2ih} = {(q2il, t2il) , (q2ih, t2ih)} represent the second period menus
which the regulator offers when the firm picked the contract γ1i in the first period.
Hence, the outcome of the regulation game with short term contracting is a first period menu
{γ1l, γ1h} and a subsequent tuple
Γ = {(βl, βh), (ν2l, ν2h), {γ2ll, γ2lh}, {γ2hl, γ2hh}},
which describes the firm’s reporting strategies (βl, βh), the regulator’s updated beliefs (ν2l, ν2h), and
the second period menus {γ2ll, γ2lh} and {γ2hl, γ2hh}.
Given a first period menu {γ1l, γ1h}, the outcome Γ constitutes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(PBE) if
1. (Bayes’ consistency) the regulator’s updated beliefs (ν2l, ν2h) are Bayes’ consistent with the
firm’s reporting strategies (βl, βh);
8This result follows because if βi = 0 then βl + βh ≥ 1 implies βj = 1, so that the contract γ1j is picked with
probability 1 while γ1i is never picked. This is however equivalent to a menu with γ1i = γ1j and allowing the firm to
randomize such that βl + βh = 1 with βl > 0 and βh > 0.
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2. (sequential rationality) the regulator’s second period menus {γ2ll, γ2lh} and {γ2hl, γ2hh} are op-
timal given his respective beliefs ν2l and ν2h;
3. (optimal reporting) the reporting strategies (βl, βh) are optimal given the first period menu
{γ1l, γ1h} and the regulator’s second period offers {γ2ll, γ2lh} and {γ2hl, γ2hh}.
A solution to the regulation game with short term contracting is a first period menu {γ1l, γ1h} along
with a PBE outcome Γ that maximizes the regulator’s objective under the condition that the firm
receives non-negative profits. We next discuss the restrictions which these three different equilibrium
requirements put on the outcome Γ.
Bayes’ consistency
Since we can restrict attention to βl > 0 and βh > 0, out-of-equilibrium considerations are irrelevant
and Bayes’ consistency simply entails
νh(βl, βh) ≡
ν(1− βl)
(1− ν)βh + ν(1− βl)
; (4)
νl(βl, βh) ≡
νβl
(1− ν)(1− βh) + νβl
.
It follows from βl + βh ≥ 1 that νh(βl, βh) ≤ ν ≤ νl(βl, βh). Hence, Bayes’ consistency implies that if
the firm selects the contract γ1i in the first period, this raises the regulator’s beliefs that the firm is
of type ci.
Sequential rationality
The requirement that the second period offer is sequentially rational implies that the menu {γ2il, γ2ih}
must be optimal given the regulator’s updated beliefs ν2i. Consequently, the second period menu
coincides with the optimal static mechanism of Lemma 1 with the probability ν2i that the firm is
efficient.
We know from Lemma 2 that, in the pessimistic case ν < ν, a regulator with full commitment
powers finds it optimal to offer a pooling menu for both periods. Since this contract does not affect
the regulator’s updated beliefs, we obtain the following result.
Lemma 3 (pessimistic case) Suppose ν < ν. Then, a first period full pooling menu γ1l = γ1h =
(1, ch) with reporting strategies βl + βh = 1, and a PBE outcome Γ with second period full pooling
menus γ2ll = γ2lh = γ2hl = γ2hh = (1, ch) yields the regulator the same payoff as the optimal long term
contract and is optimal.
9
Conversely, it seems that, in the optimistic case ν ≥ ν, short term contracts cannot achieve the
optimal outcome under long term contracting. Lemma 2 indicates that in this case the regulator
with full commitment powers offers a separating contract for both periods which shuts down the
production of the inefficient firm and leaves no rents to the efficient firm. This contracting structure
is not sequentially rational, because the firm’s private information is fully revealed in the first period
and therefore the regulator has an incentive to propose a new second period contract which induces
the inefficient firm to produce with a transfer that exactly covers its costs.
Hence, for the optimistic case ν ≥ ν¯, the equilibrium requirements imposed by short term con-
tracting put non-trivial restrictions on the dynamic regulation game. In particular, Bayes’ consistency
and sequential rationality imply that, in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the firm’s reporting strate-
gies fully determine the updated beliefs ν2i and the second period contract menus {γ2ll, γ2lh} and
{γ2hl, γ2hh}.
Lemma 4 (second period contracts) Suppose ν ≥ ν¯. Then, a PBE outcome Γ exhibits ν2l =
νl(βl, βh), ν2h = νh(βl, βh), and {γ2ll, γ2lh} = {(1, cl) , (0, 0)}. Moreover,
i) for νh(βl, βh) < ν¯ the tuple Γ exhibits γ2hl = γ2hh = (1, ch);
ii) for νh(βl, βh) ≥ ν¯ the tuple Γ exhibits {γ2hl, γ2hh} = {(1, cl) , (0, 0)}.
Optimal reporting
We next turn to the implications of the final, third requirement that the firm’s reporting strategies
(βl, βh) must be optimal given the first period menu and the second period offers. In the light of
Lemma 3, we focus on the non-trivial case ν ≥ ν¯. As Lemma 4 reveals, we have γ2ll = (1, cl) in any
PBE outcome Γ. Hence, an efficient firm which picks γ1l in the first period exactly breaks even in
the second period, and its associated overall payoff is simply t1l − clq1l. Conversely, after choosing
γ1h, an efficient firm receives from γ2hl a second period profit t2hl − clq2hl, yielding an overall payoff
t1h − clq1h + ρ (t2hl − clq2hl). For any PBE outcome Γ, the reporting strategy βl is therefore optimal
if and only if
βl = arg max
β∈(0,1]
β(t1l − clq1l) + (1− β) [t1h − clq1h + ρ (t2hl − clq2hl)] . (5)
Lemma 4 also shows that, in any PBE outcome Γ, the inefficient firm does not get any rent in the
second period under either {γ2ll, γ2lh} or {γ2hl, γ2hh}. Consequently, the reporting strategy βh is
optimal if and only if
βh = arg max
β∈(0,1]
β(t1h − chq1h) + (1− β)(t1l − chq1l). (6)
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Conditions (5) and (6) summarize the equilibrium requirements concerning the firm’s reporting strat-
egy.
Taking the first-order condition for the maximization problem in (5), it follows that if βl = 1 is
optimal, we have
t1l − clq1l ≥ t1h − clq1h + ρ (t2hl − clq2hl) . (7)
This condition characterizes the usual incentive compatibility constraint for the efficient firm, which is
induced to report truthfully its costs. If βl ∈ (0, 1), then (5) implies that (7) must hold with equality.
Similarly, it follows from (6) that if βh = 1 is optimal, we have
t1h − chq1h ≥ t1l − chq1l, (8)
which represents the standard incentive compatibility condition for the inefficient firm. If βh ∈ (0, 1),
then (6) implies that (8) must be satisfied with equality.
The next lemma shows how optimal reporting and sequential rationality place limits on any PBE
outcome Γ.
Lemma 5 (information revelation) Suppose ν ≥ ν¯. Then, in any PBE outcome Γ, it holds
νh(βl, βh) ≥ ν¯. Equivalently, in any PBE outcome Γ, the reporting strategies (βl, βh) are such that
βl ≤ β¯l(βh), where
β¯l(βh) ≡ 1−
(1− ν)(S − ch)
(1− αr)ν∆c
βh ∈ (0, 1) .
Lemma 5 shows that, in the optimistic case ν ≥ ν, the regulator cannot induce too much infor-
mation revelation. In particular, it is not feasible to achieve full revelation, i.e., βl = βh = 1, because
β¯l(1) < 1. This result is a consequence of the well-known “take-the-money-and-run” strategy (Laffont
and Tirole 1993). The intuition is that an efficient firm anticipating the ratchet problem requires a
large upfront payment in order to induce it to reveal itself in the first period. This payment makes it
however attractive to the inefficient firm to claim it is efficient. When the second period is sufficiently
valuable (ρ > 1) so that the upfront payment is relatively large, the regulator that wants to induce
full information revelation cannot resolve the conflict between the two incentive problems; the two
incentive constraints (7) and (8) are mutually inconsistent.
Laffont and Tirole (1987, 1993) show that, in a dynamic regulatory framework which builds on
Laffont and Tirole (1986) with short term contracting, it is hard to get analytical solutions even in
two-type models. Therefore, they resort to numerical simulations to illustrate possible results. One
of our contributions is to show that a dynamic regulation model a` la Baron and Myerson (1982)
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puts enough structure on the problem to obtain analytical solutions, while still being rich enough to
illustrate the relevant effects of short term contracting.
For the optimistic case ν ≥ ν, Lemma 5 ensures that we can restrict attention to ν2h = νh(βl, βh) ≥
ν. Because ν2l = νl(βl, βh) ≥ ν ≥ ν, Lemma 4 and the discussion following Lemma 1 imply that the
regulator’s aggregate (expected) payoff in (2) for a first period menu {γ1l, γ1h} and a PBE outcome
Γ, can be written as
V = ν {βl[Sq1l − t1l + αr(t1l − clq1l)] + (1− βl)[Sq1h − t1h + αr(t1h − clq1h)] + ρ(S − cl)}
+(1− ν) {βh[Sq1h − t1h + αr(t1h − chq1h)] + (1− βh)[Sq1l − t1l + αr(t1l − chq1l)]} . (9)
In order to induce the firm’s participation, overall profits from the regulatory relationship must
be non-negative. We know from Lemma 4 that for ν2l ≥ ν and ν2h ≥ ν¯ the efficient firm does not get
any rent in the second period, so that its participation constraint reduces to
βl (t1l − clq1l) + (1− βl) (t1h − clq1h) ≥ 0. (10)
Likewise, the participation constraint of the inefficient firm is
βh (t1h − chq1h) + (1− βh) (t1l − chq1l) ≥ 0. (11)
Hence, for the optimistic case ν ≥ ν, the regulator solves
P o : max
βl,βh,q1l,q1h,t1l,t1h
V s.t. (5), (6), (10), (11),
under the domain restriction βl ≤ β¯l(βh).
The additional domain restriction in problem P o reflects the regulator’s inability to fully separate
types in the first period. We know from Lemma 5 that the efficient firm can pick “its” contract γ1l at
most with probability β¯l(βh) ∈ (0, 1) when the inefficient firm picks “its” contract γ1h with probability
βh. Hence, full information revelation cannot be achieved and only partial separation is feasible, which
implies some misallocation of types to contracts in the first period. This observation suggests that
short term contracting increases the cutoff level above which the regulator no longer pools types in
the first period. Moreover, when partial separation is implemented, it seems natural to induce the
highest degree of information revelation, i.e., βl = βl (1) and βh = 1, since this increases allocative
efficiency at no cost in terms of informational rents.
Defining the cutoff level
ν˜ ≡
(S − ch) (S − cl + (1− αr)∆c)
(S − ch) (S − cl + (1− αr)∆c) + (1− αr)
2 (∆c)2
∈ (ν, 1) ,
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the following lemma corroborates the two aforementioned insights formally.9
Lemma 6 (optimistic case) Suppose ν ≥ ν¯. Then, a solution to the regulation problem with short
term contracting, P o, depends on the likelihood of the efficient firm, ν ∈ (0, 1), as follows:
(i) For ν < ν˜ it consists of a first period full pooling menu γ1l = γ1h = (1, ch) with reporting
strategies βl + βh = 1, and a PBE outcome Γ with second period full separation menus {γ2ll, γ2lh} =
{γ2hl, γ2hh} = {(1, cl), (0, 0)}.
(ii) For ν ≥ ν˜ it consists of a first period partial separation menu {γ1l, γ1h} = {(1, cl), (0, 0)}
with reporting strategies βl = β¯l(1) and βh = 1, and a PBE outcome Γ with full separation menus
{γ2ll, γ2lh} = {γ2hl, γ2hh} = {(1, cl), (0, 0)}.
Equipped with the results of Lemma 3 and Lemma 6 we are finally able to fully characterize the
solution to the regulation problem with short term contracting.
Proposition 1 (optimal regulation with short term contracting) The optimal two-period reg-
ulatory policy with short term contracting depends on the likelihood of the efficient firm, ν ∈ (0, 1), as
follows:
(i) For ν < ν it coincides with the solution under long term contracting and consists of a first
period full pooling menu γ1l = γ1h = (1, ch) with reporting strategies βl + βh = 1, and a PBE outcome
Γ with full pooling menus γ2ll = γ2lh = γ2hl = γ2hh = (1, ch).
(ii) For ν ∈ [ν, ν˜) it consists of a first period full pooling menu γ1l = γ1h = (1, ch) with reporting
strategies βl + βh = 1, and a PBE outcome Γ with full separation menus {γ2ll, γ2lh} = {γ2hl, γ2hh} =
{(1, cl), (0, 0)}.
(iii) For ν ≥ ν˜ it consists of a first period partial separation menu {γ1l, γ1h} = {(1, cl), (0, 0)}
with reporting strategies βl = β¯l(1) and βh = 1, and a PBE outcome Γ with full separation menus
{γ2ll, γ2lh} = {γ2hl, γ2hh} = {(1, cl), (0, 0)}.
The discussion following Lemma 5 emphasizes that, for the optimistic case ν ≥ ν¯, the ratchet
effect prevents the regulator from achieving full information revelation in the first period. Proposition
1 indicates that the regulator has two options to cope with this problem. Either he refrains from
offering a revelation contract in the first period altogether, or he designs a partial separation contract
that still induces some information revelation. The advantage of the pooling contract is that it
ensures production in the first period, whereas partial separation allows the regulator to save rents
9Note that ν˜ = (S−ch)(S−cl+(1−αr)∆c)
(S−ch)(S−cl+(1−αr)∆c)+(1−αr)
2(∆c)2
= (S−ch)(S−cl+(1−αr)∆c)
(S−ch)(S−cl)+(S−ch+(1−αr)∆c)(1−αr)∆c
>
(S−ch)(S−cl+(1−αr)∆c)
(S−ch+(1−αr)∆c)(S−cl)+(S−ch+(1−αr)∆c)(1−αr)∆c
= (S−ch)(S−cl+(1−αr)∆c)
(S−ch+(1−αr)∆c)(S−cl+(1−αr)∆c)
= (S−ch)
(S−ch+(1−αr)∆c)
= ν¯.
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to the efficient firm. Clearly, the second option is only attractive when the efficient firm is relatively
likely. Proposition 1 reflects this intuition and shows that a first period partial separation contract is
preferable if the probability of an efficient firm is sufficiently high.
4 Optimal strategic delegation
We are now in a position to investigate whether Congress benefits from strategic delegation by assigning
the regulator a mandate with a profit weight αr that differs from her own weight αc. The following
proposition shows that there is no gain from strategic delegation as long as the regulator can commit
to long term contracts. This intuitive result emphasizes that any benefit of strategic delegation in the
regulation problem with short term contracting is indeed due to a lack of commitment to long term
contracts.
Proposition 2 Under long term contracting there is no value from strategic delegation and Congress
finds it optimal to set a regulatory weight on profits αr = αc.
We next examine the scope for strategic delegation under short term contracting. A direct impli-
cation of Proposition 2 is that strategic delegation is potentially valuable for ν ≥ ν (αc). Indeed, we
know from Lemma 3 that for ν < ν (αc) short term contracts achieve the same outcome as under long
term contracting, and therefore strategic delegation cannot be helpful.
Note from Proposition 1 that the regulatory outcome - and thereby Congress’ payoff - crucially
depends on the weight αr via the two cutoff values ν¯ and ν˜ that determine how the regulator optimally
trades off allocative efficiency against rent extraction. In addition, the weight αr affects the reporting
probability βl(1) under partial separation. In order to express this dependence more explicitly, we
write ν¯(αr), ν˜(αr), and βˆl(αr), where
βˆl(αr) ≡ βl(1) = 1−
(1− ν)(S − ch)
(1− αr)ν∆c
.
Using the results in Proposition 1, Congress’ aggregate (expected) payoff in (1) can be represented as
a function of the regulatory weight αr in the following way:
W (αr) =


W fc ≡ (1 + ρ) (S − ch + ναc∆c) if ν < ν(αr)
W p ≡ S − ch + ναc∆c+ νρ(S − cl) if ν ∈ [ν(αr), ν˜(αr))
W ps(αr) ≡ ν(S − cl)
(
βˆl(αr) + ρ
)
if ν ≥ ν˜(αr).
(12)
Defining
ν∗ (αc) ≡
(S − ch) (S − cl +∆c)
(S − ch) (S − cl +∆c) + (1− αc) (∆c)
2 ∈ (ν (αc) , 1)
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enables us to present our main result.10
Proposition 3 (optimal delegation) For ν > ν∗(αc), Congress strictly benefits from strategic dele-
gation. Optimal delegation assigns the regulator a profit weight αr = 0, i.e., a pure consumer standard.
For ν ≤ ν∗(αc), Congress does not benefit from strategic delegation and finds it optimal to set a weight
αr = αc, implying a regulator with an unbiased welfare perspective.
Proposition 3 shows that if strategic delegation is beneficial, then it induces the regulator to be
tougher on the firm by assigning him a pure consumer standard. In order to understand the intuition
behind this result, it is helpful to reconsider the logic why ratchet effects are actually problematic.
We know from Lemma 2 that for ν ≥ ν a regulator with full commitment optimally commits to an ex
post inefficiently low output of the inefficient firm in order to reduce the (relatively costly) rents to
the efficient firm. This regulatory behavior is however not feasible with short term contracting. Once
a myopic regulator has learned that the firm is inefficient, he finds it no longer optimal to distort its
production downwards. It is exactly this myopic reaction that triggers the ratchet problem, because
the efficient firm anticipates that it would receive a higher rent in the second period if it claims to
be inefficient in the first. If the regulator did not succumb to the temptation to raise the inefficient
firm’s output, then the efficient firm would not require a higher rent for revealing its information and
the problems associated with the rachet effect would not arise. This insight clarifies that a crucial
driver of the ratchet problem is the regulator’s temptation to raise the firm’s output after learning it
is inefficient. A pure consumer standard, which places more emphasis on rent extraction, alleviates
this temptation. It reduces the need for long term rents to the efficient firm and thereby mitigates
the ratchet effect.11 In comparison to Congress’ (weighted) welfare perspective, a consumer standard
comes, however, at the allocative cost of a further reduction in the inefficient firm’s production. An
additional cost follows from some misallocation of firm’s types to contracts in equilibrium. As a
result, Congress faces a cost-benefit trade-off when delegating regulation. Since this trade-off shifts
in favor of strategic delegation with the likelihood of the efficient firm, strategic delegation is optimal
when the efficient firm is relatively likely.12 Conversely, when the efficient firm is relatively unlikely,
10Note ν∗(αc) =
(S−ch)(S−cl+∆c)
(S−ch)(S−cl+∆c)+(1−αc)(∆c)
2 =
(S−ch)(S−cl+∆c)
(S−ch)(S−cl)+(S−ch+(1−αc)∆c)∆c
>
(S−ch)(S−cl+∆c)
(S−ch+(1−αc)∆c)(S−cl)+(S−ch+(1−αc)∆c)∆c
= (S−ch)(S−cl+∆c)
(S−ch+(1−αc)∆c)(S−cl+∆c)
= (S−ch)
S−ch+(1−αc)∆c
= ν¯(αc).
11Referring to Proposition 1, one may establish this effect formally by noting that the cutoff ν˜, below which the
regulator raises the output of the contract γ1h, is increasing in αr. Hence, the beneficial effect of a lower αr is to allow
a larger degree of separation, while keeping the efficient firm’s long term rents at zero.
12A consumer standard facilitates separation between firm’s types at the cost that the efficient firm picks the distorted
contract γ1h with a positive probability 1− β̂l (0) which decreases in ν, due to ∂β̂l (0) /∂ν > 0.
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Figure 1: Optimal strategic delegation
the allocative cost of distorting production is too high and a regulator with an unbiased welfare
perspective is preferable.
The proposition further shows that strategic delegation with a more lenient mandate, which assigns
a greater weight on profits than Congress’ preferences, is never optimal. In the light of the usual
intuition that the problem behind the ratchet effect is driven by the regulator’s inability to resist
expropriating rents after learning new information, this conclusion seems surprising because a more
lenient regulator is indeed less eager to extract rents. Yet, a more lenient regulator is less inclined to
distort the output of the inefficient firm. We find from Lemma 2 that for ν ≥ ν (αc), where strategic
delegation is potentially helpful, this is exactly the opposite of what a regulator with full commitment
powers would do. A more lenient mandate therefore aggravates rather than mitigates the ratchet
effect.
As Figure 1 illustrates, Congress’ optimal delegation decision depends on the likelihood of the
efficient firm ν and the weight αc Congress assigns to profits. A lower αc relaxes the condition
ν > ν∗(αc) and thereby increases the scope where strategic delegation is optimal. This is because a
regulator with a pure consumer standard better reflects the preferences of a Congress with a greater
interest in consumer surplus. Consequently, our model predicts that strategic delegation should be
prevalent in countries where firms are expected to be relatively efficient and policy makers are, a priori,
already more concerned with consumers’ well-being. These implications may lend themselves for an
empirical validation of our results.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we show that strategic delegation to an independent regulator with a pure consumer
standard improves dynamic regulation by mitigating ratchet effects associated with short term con-
tracting. These results are formally derived in a repeated version of the Baron and Myerson (1982)
model, which allows a full characterization of the optimal regulatory contract. Despite its stylized
formulation, the formal analysis suggests that the principles underlying our results are general. Ulti-
mately, the dynamic incentive problem with short term contracting is that the regulator cannot refrain
from rent expropriation once he has learned the firm’s private information. A pure consumer standard,
which places more emphasis on firm’s rent extraction, alleviates the regulator’s myopic temptation
to raise the production of the inefficient firm after learning private information, and therefore limits
the need for rents to the efficient firm. This mitigates ratchet effects but comes at the cost of a
further output distortion for the inefficient firm, in comparison to the genuine social welfare function.
Consequently, strategic delegation with a pure consumer standard is optimal if the efficient firm is
sufficiently likely so that benefits outweigh costs. Otherwise, a regulator with an unbiased welfare
perspective is preferable.
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Appendix 1
This appendix collects the proofs.
Proof of Lemma 1: Maximizing (3) for ql yields ql = 1, while qh = 1 maximizes (3) for ν < ν¯ and
qh = 0 maximizes (3) for ν ≥ ν¯.
13 The values for tl and th obtain from the binding participation
constraint of the inefficient firm, th = chqh, and the binding incentive constraint of the efficient firm,
tl = clql +∆cqh. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: The proof follows from the argument in Laffont and Tirole (1993, p. 104) that
if some different, possibly time variant contract is optimal, then one can construct an appropriate
possibly random contract for the static problem that leads to a higher payoff. This would contradict
the optimality of the optimal static contract of Lemma 1.14 Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: Consider the first period contract menu γ1l = γ1h = (1, ch). It follows that for
ν < ν an outcome Γ with βl = βh = 1, ν2l = ν2h = ν, and γ2ll = γ2lh = γ2hl = γ2hh = (1, ch) constitutes
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, because it satisfies Bayes’ consistency, sequential rationality, and
optimal reporting. It yields the regulator W fcl = (1 + ρ) (S − cl − (1− αr)∆c) when facing a cost
type cl and W
fc
h = (1 + ρ) (S − ch) when facing a cost type ch. These payoffs coincide with those
under the optimal long term contract of Lemma 2. Because the regulator cannot improve on long
term contracting, the contract described in the lemma is also optimal. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4: Given the reporting strategies (βl, βh), Bayes’ consistency implies ν2l = νl (βl, βh)
and ν2h = νh (βl, βh). Because νl(βl, βh) ≥ ν, the lemma’s supposition ν ≥ ν¯ implies νl(βl, βh) ≥ ν¯.
By Lemma 1, sequential rationality implies {γ2ll, γ2lh} = {(1, cl) , (0, 0)}, while γ2hl = γ2hh = (1, ch) if
νh(βl, βh) < ν, and {γ2hl, γ2hh} = {(1, cl) , (0, 0)} if νh(βl, βh) ≥ ν. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5: Suppose to the contrary that a PBE outcome with νh(βl, βh) < ν¯ exists. Lemma
4 implies that in any such PBE the efficient firm receives a rent t2hl− clq2hl = ∆c after reporting type
ch in the first period. Hence, the necessary condition (7) reduces to t1l − t1h − cl(q1l − q1h) ≥ ρ∆c,
whereas the necessary condition (8) implies t1h − t1l + ch(q1l− q1h) ≥ 0. Adding both inequalities and
dividing by ∆c yields q1l − q1h ≥ ρ, which contradicts q1l, q1h ∈ [0, 1] and ρ > 1. Hence, we must have
νh(βl, βh) ≥ ν¯ in any PBE outcome. Using (4), this is equivalent to βl ≤ β¯l (βh). Q.E.D.
13Note that for ν = ν the solution is not unique and any qh ∈ [0, 1] maximizes (3). We pick the solution qh = 0,
because only this choice ensures the existence of an optimal contract in the dynamic regulatory game.
14That a non-degenerate random contract is suboptimal follows directly from Strausz (2006).
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Proof of Lemma 6: It follows from Lemma 5 that βl ∈ (0, 1), which implies that the incentive
constraint (5) is equivalent to the constraint (7) satisfied with equality. Moreover, at least one of
the participation constraints (10) or (11) in P o is binding at the optimum, because if they were
both slack, one could raise the regulatory objective V in P o by reducing t1l and t1h by the same
degree, as this neither affects (5) nor (6). Moreover, this binding constraint must be (11), since, as
usual, the necessary conditions (7) and (8) - which follow from (5) and (6) - and the participation
constraint of the inefficient firm (11) imply the participation constraint of the efficient firm (10):
βl(t1l − clq1l) + (1− βl)(t1h − clq1h) ≥ t1h− clq1h = βh (t1h − chq1h) + (1− βh) (t1h − chq1h) +∆cq1h ≥
βh (t1h − chq1h) + (1− βh) (t1l − chq1l) + ∆cq1h ≥ ∆cq1h ≥ 0.
Consequently, a solution to P o coincides with a solution to a transformed problem, where constraint
(5) is replaced by the binding constraint (7) together with t2hl = cl and q2hl = 1 (by the combination
of Lemma 4 and Lemma 5), the constraint (11) is satisfied with equality, and the constraint (10) is
disregarded.
We solve this transformed problem in two steps. First, we check whether βh ∈ (0, 1) is optimal.
If this is the case, then (6) is equivalent to (8) satisfied with equality and the transformed problem
becomes
P ′ : max
βl,βh,q1l,q1h,t1l,t1h
V
s.t. t1l − clq1l = t1h − clq1h (13)
t1h − chq1h = t1l − chq1l (14)
βh (t1h − chq1h) + (1− βh) (t1l − chq1l) = 0 (15)
βl ≤ β¯l(βh), (16)
where V is given by (9). Constraints (14) and (15) imply t1h = chq1h and t1l = chq1l. Using in
addition (13), it follows q1l = q1h. Substituting out these three variables, the objective function V in
P ′ simplifies to
ν[(S − ch + αr∆c)q1l + ρ(S − cl)] + (1− ν)(S − ch)q1l,
which must be maximized with respect to q1l under (16). The expression is independent of βl and βh
and maximized for q1l = 1. This implies q1h = 1, t1l = t1h = ch with βl + βh = 1,
15 and yields the
regulator the payoff
V p ≡ S − ch + ναr∆c+ νρ(S − cl).
We next check whether βh = 1 is optimal, while not being a solution to P
′.16 If this is the case,
15Notice that (16) is satisfied at the optimum.
16If βh = 1 is optimal and at the same time a solution to P
′, then the regulator’s optimal payoff is actually V p.
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then at any solution (14) is satisfied with a strict inequality rather than an equality. Using βh = 1,
(15) simplifies to t1h = chq1h, so that (13) implies t1l = clq1l+∆cq1h. Consequently, (14) with a strict
inequality implies q1h < q1l and, moreover, the objective V simplifies to
νβl(S − cl)(q1l + ρ) + ν(1− βl)(S − cl)(q1h + ρ)− ν(1− αr)∆cq1h + (1− ν)(S − ch)q1h.
The expression is increasing in q1l so that q1l = 1 is optimal. This implies that (14) is only satisfied
with a strict inequality if q1h < q1l = 1. Since the expression is linear in q1h, then βh = 1 is optimal,
while not being a solution to P ′, when the expression is decreasing in q1h so that q1h = 0 must be
optimal.17 Therefore, the expression is increasing in βl so that (16) must bind at the optimum. If
βh = 1 is optimal while not being a solution to P
′, then we get βl = β¯l(1) ≡ β̂l (αr) and the regulator’s
payoff becomes
V ps ≡ ν(S − cl)(β̂l (αr) + ρ) = ν(S − cl)
[
1 + ρ−
(1− ν)(S − ch)
(1− αr)ν∆c
]
.
Straightforward computations reveal that V ps ≥ V p if and only if ν ≥ ν˜.
The second period contract menus {γ2ll, γ2lh} = {γ2hl, γ2hh} = {(1, cl), (0, 0)} follow from the
combination of Lemma 4 and Lemma 5. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof follows directly from Lemma 3 and Lemma 6. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: With αr = αc the regulator implements Congress’ optimal long term
contract in Lemma 2. Hence, for some αr 6= αc Congress cannot obtain a strictly larger payoff, as this
would violate the optimality of the long term contract in Lemma 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: The proof goes through the following four steps.
Step 1: Suppose ν < ν¯(αc). Then, αr = αc is optimal, because αr = αc induces the regulator to
implement the contract in Lemma 3, which coincides with Congress’ optimal long term contract.
Step 2: Suppose ν ≥ ν¯(αc). We show that Congress prefers αr = αc to any αr > αc. To see
this, note first that ν and ν˜ are strictly increasing in αr, so that αc < αr implies ν¯(αc) < ν¯(αr) and
ν˜(αc) < ν˜(αr). Moreover, ν¯(αr) < ν˜(αr) and ν¯(αc) < ν˜(αc). Hence, we have either the ordering
ν¯(αc) < ν¯(αr) < ν˜(αc) < ν˜(αr) or the ordering ν¯(αc) < ν˜(αc) ≤ ν¯(αr) < ν˜(αr). Depending on
ν ∈ (0, 1), we distinguish the following four cases under the first ordering:
(i) For ν ∈ [ν¯(αc), ν¯(αr)) it follows from (12) thatW (αc)−W (αr) = W
p−W fc = S−ch+ναc∆c+
νρ(S − cl)− (1 + ρ) (S − ch + ναc∆c) ≥ 0, where the inequality holds since ν ≥ ν¯(αc).
17From the first-order condition for q1h this is the case if and only if βl ≥ β˜l, where β˜l ≡ 1−
ν(1−αr)∆c−(1−ν)(S−ch)
ν(S−cl)
.
Notice that β˜l ≤ β¯l(1) for ν ≥ ν˜, so that the interval
[
β˜l, β¯l(1)
]
is non-empty.
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(ii) For ν ∈ [ν¯(αr), ν˜(αc)) it follows from (12) that W (αc)−W (αr) = W
p −W p = 0.
(iii) For ν ∈ [ν˜(αc), ν˜(αr)) it follows from (12) that W (αc) −W (αr) = W
ps(αc) −W
p = ν(S −
cl)
(
βˆl(αc) + ρ
)
− [S − ch + ναc∆c+ νρ(S − cl)] ≥ 0, where the inequality holds since ν ≥ ν˜(αc).
(iv) For ν ≥ ν˜(αr) it follows from (12) that W (αc) − W (αr) = W
ps(αc) − W
ps(αr) = ν(S −
cl)
(
βˆl(αc) + ρ
)
−ν(S− cl)
(
βˆl(αr) + ρ
)
> 0, where the inequality holds since βˆl(.) is strictly decreas-
ing.
Under the second ordering we obtain the following four cases:
(v) For ν ∈ [ν¯(αc), ν˜(αc)) it follows from case (i) that W (αc)−W (αr) = W
p −W fc ≥ 0.
(vi) For ν ∈ [ν˜(αc), ν¯(αr)) it follows from (12) that W (αc) −W (αr) = W
ps(αc) −W
fc = ν(S −
cl)
(
βˆl(αc) + ρ
)
− (1 + ρ) (S − ch + ναc∆c) > 0, where the inequality holds since ν ≥ ν˜(αc).
(vii) For ν ∈ [ν¯(αr), ν˜(αr)) it follows from case (iii) that W (αc)−W (αr) = W
ps(αc)−W
p ≥ 0.
(viii) For ν ≥ ν˜(αr) it follows from case (iv) that W (αc)−W (αr) = W
ps(αc)−W
ps(αr) > 0.
Step 3: If ν > ν∗ (αc), Congress strictly prefers αr = 0 to αr = αc. Otherwise, Congress prefers
αr = αc to αr = 0. To see this, note first that we have either the ordering ν¯(0) < ν¯(αc) < ν˜(0) < ν˜(αc)
or the ordering ν¯(0) < ν˜(0) ≤ ν¯(αc) < ν˜(αc). The first ordering reduces to ν¯(αc) < ν˜(0) < ν˜(αc) and
the second ordering reduces to ν¯(αc) < ν˜(αc), since Step 1 implies that Congress finds it optimal to
set αr = αc for ν < ν¯(αc). Depending on ν ∈ (0, 1), we distinguish the following three cases under the
first ordering:
(ix) For ν ∈ [ν¯(αc), ν˜ (0)) it follows from (12) that W (0)−W (αc) = W
p −W p = 0.
(x) For ν ∈ [ν˜ (0) , ν˜ (αc)) it follows from (12) that W (0) − W (αc) = W
ps (0) − W p = ν(S −
cl)
(
βˆl(0) + ρ
)
− [S − ch + ναc∆c+ νρ(S − cl)] > 0 if and only if ν > ν
∗ (αc) ∈ (ν˜ (0) , ν˜ (αc)).
(xi) For ν ≥ ν˜ (αc) it follows from (12) that W (0) − W (αc) = W
ps (0) − W ps (αc) = ν(S −
cl)
(
βˆl(0) + ρ
)
−ν(S−cl)
(
βˆl(αc) + ρ
)
> 0, where the inequality holds since βˆl(.) is strictly decreasing.
The second ordering yields the following two cases:
(xii) For ν ∈ [ν¯(αc), ν˜ (αc)) it follows from case (x) that W (0) −W (αc) = W
ps (0) −W p > 0 if
and only if ν > ν∗ (αc) ∈ (ν¯(αc), ν˜ (αc)).
(xiii) For ν ≥ ν˜ (αc) it follows from case (xi) that W (0)−W (αc) = W
ps (0)−W ps (αc) > 0.
Step 4: Congress prefers either αr = 0 or αr = αc to any αr ∈ (0, αc). To see this, substitute
αr = 0 with αr ∈ (0, αc) in Step 3. This does not affect welfare in case (ix) but reduces welfare in
cases (x) and (xi) or in cases (xii) and (xiii), since W ps decreases in αr.
Proposition 3 follows from combining Steps 1, 2, 3, 4. Q.E.D.
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Appendix 2
This appendix extends our results to the case ρ ≤ 1. Defining
ρ ≡
(1− ν) (S − cl) (S − ch)
(1− αr)∆c [ν (1− αr)∆c− (1− ν) (S − ch)]
,
we can characterize the optimal regulatory policy in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (optimal regulation with short term contracting) Suppose 0 < ρ ≤ 1. The
optimal two-period regulatory policy with short term contracting depends on the likelihood of the effi-
cient firm, ν ∈ (0, 1), as follows:
(i) For ν < ν it coincides with the solution under long term contracting and consists of a first
period full pooling menu γ1l = γ1h = (1, ch) with reporting strategies βl + βh = 1, and a PBE outcome
Γ with full pooling menus γ2ll = γ2lh = γ2hl = γ2hh = (1, ch).
(ii) For ν ∈ [ν, ν˜), and for ν ≥ ν˜ together with ρ < ρ ∈ (0, 1], it consists of a first period full
separation menu {γ1l, γ1h} = {(1, cl + ρ∆c), (0, 0)} with reporting strategies βl = βh = 1, and a PBE
outcome Γ with full separation menus {γ2ll, γ2lh} = {γ2hl, γ2hh} = {(1, cl), (1, ch)}.
(iii) For ν ≥ ν˜ and ρ ≥ ρ ∈ (0, 1] it consists of a first period partial separation menu {γ1l, γ1h} =
{(1, cl), (0, 0)} with reporting strategies βl = β¯l(1) and βh = 1, and a PBE outcome Γ with full
separation menus {γ2ll, γ2lh} = {γ2hl, γ2hh} = {(1, cl), (0, 0)}.
Proof of Proposition 4: Following the same approach as in the proof of Lemma 6, it is straight-
forward to show that the participation constraint of the efficient firm is slack, while the participation
constraint of the inefficient firm is binding in equilibrium. The regulator’s problem becomes
P
′′
: max
βl,βh,q1l,q1h,t1l,t1h
ν {βl [Sq1l − t1l + αr (t1l − clq1l) + ρWl (ν2l)] (17)
+ (1− βl) [Sq1h − t1h + αr (t1h − clq1h) + ρWl (ν2h)]}
+(1− ν) {βh [Sq1h − t1h + αr (t1h − chq1h) + ρWh (ν2h)]
+ (1− βh) [Sq1l − t1l + αr (t1l − chq1l) + ρWh (ν2l)]}
s.t. t1l − clq1l ≥ t1h − clq1h + ρ (t2hl − clq2hl) (18)
t1h − chq1h ≥ t1l − chq1l (19)
βh (t1h − chq1h) + (1− βh) (t1l − chq1l) = 0, (20)
where the incentive constraints (18) and (19) hold with equality if βl ∈ (0, 1) and βh ∈ (0, 1), respec-
tively. We have to consider the following four cases: (I) βl = βh = 1; (II) βl ∈ (0, 1), βh ∈ (0, 1); (III)
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βl = 1, βh ∈ (0, 1); (IV) βl ∈ (0, 1), βh = 1. We know from Lemma 3 that for ν ≤ ν the solution to the
regulatory problem coincides with the solution under long term contracting, and thus we can restrict
attention to ν ≥ ν.
Case I (βl = βh = 1). Standard arguments imply that (18) is binding, while (19) can be neglected.
Substituting t1h = chq1h from (20) and t1l = clq1l + ∆cq1h + ρ∆c from (18) into (17) the regulator’s
objective becomes
ν [Sq1l − clq1l − (1− αr)∆cq1h + ρ (S − cl − (1− αr)∆c)] + (1− ν) [Sq1h − chq1h + ρ (S − cl)] ,
which is maximized for q1l = 1 and q1h = 0. The regulator’s payoff is
V fs ≡ ν (1 + ρ) (S − cl) + ρ (1− ν) (S − ch)− νρ (1− αr)∆c.
Case II (βl ∈ (0, 1) , βh ∈ (0, 1)). Note that both (18) and (19) are binding, which implies after
some manipulation q1l − q1h =
ρ
∆c (t2hl − clq2hl). Moreover, from (20) we obtain t1h = chq1h and
t1l = chq1l. Two possible subcases arise.
(i) ν2h < ν. As t2hl − clq2hl = ∆c by Lemma 4, we have q1l = q1h + ρ, with q1h ∈ [0, 1 − ρ] since
q1l, q1h ∈ [0, 1]. Substituting these conditions into (17) the regulator’s payoff becomes
ν {βl [(S − ch) (q1h + ρ) + αr (q1h + ρ)∆c+ ρ (S − cl)]
+ (1− βl) [Sq1h − chq1h + αr∆cq1h + ρ (S − cl − (1− αr)∆c)]}
+(1− ν) {βh [Sq1h − chq1h + ρ (S − ch)] + (1− βh) (S − ch) (q1h + ρ)} ,
which is maximized for q1h = 1− ρ and q1l = 1. Hence, the regulator’s payoff is ν (S − ch + αr∆c) +
νβlρ (S − cl) + (1− ν) (S − ch) < V
fs so that subcase (i) is irrelevant.
(ii) ν2h ≥ ν. As t2hl−clq2hl = 0 by Lemma 4, we have q1l = q1h, and the regulator’s payoff becomes
Sq1l − chq1l + ναr∆cq1l + νρ (S − cl), which is maximized for q1l = q1h = 1. The regulator’s payoff is
S− ch+ ναr∆c+ νρ (S − cl) ≤ V
fs, which implies that subcase (ii) is also irrelevant. Therefore, case
II is irrelevant.
Case III (βl = 1, βh ∈ (0, 1)). From the binding (19) and (20) we have t1h = chq1h and t1l = chq1l.
Substituting these conditions into (17) yields after some manipulation
ν [Sq1l − chq1l + αr∆cq1l + ρ (S − cl)]+(1− ν) {βh [Sq1h − chq1h + ρ (S − ch) + (1− βh) (Sq1l − chq1l)]} ,
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which is maximized for q1l = 1. Since (18) implies q1l > q1h and the regulator’s objective is linear in
q1h, we must have q1h = 0 in equilibrium. The regulator’s payoff is S − ch + ναr∆c + νρ (S − cl) −
(1− ν)βh (1− ρ) (S − ch) < V
ps, so that case III is irrelevant.
Case IV (βl ∈ (0, 1) , βh = 1). Note that the binding (18) and (20) imply t1h = chq1h and
t1l = clq1l +∆cq1h + ρ (t2hl − clq2hl). Two subcases arise.
(i) ν2h < ν. As t2hl − clq2hl = ∆c by Lemma 4, (17) becomes
ν {βl [Sq1l − clq1l −∆cq1h − ρ∆c+ αr∆c (q1h + ρ) + ρ (S − cl)]
+ (1− βl) [Sq1h − chq1h + αr∆cq1h + ρ (S − cl − (1− αr)∆c)]}
+(1− ν) [Sq1h − chq1h + ρ (S − ch)] ,
which is maximized for q1l = 1. Summing (18) and (19) implies q1l > q1h. Since the regulator’s
objective is linear in q1h, we must have q1h = 0 in equilibrium. The regulator’s payoff becomes
νρ (S − ch + αr∆c) + νβl (S − cl) + ρ (1− ν) (S − ch) < V
fs so that subcase (i) is irrelevant.
(ii) ν2h ≥ ν. As t2hl − clq2hl = 0 by Lemma 4, (17) becomes
ν {βl [Sq1l − clq1l −∆cq1h + αr∆cq1h + ρ (S − cl)]
+ (1− βl) [Sq1h − chq1h + αr∆cq1h + ρ (S − cl)]}+ (1− ν) (Sq1h − chq1h)
s.t. βl ≤ βl (1) ≡ β̂l (αr) ,
which is maximized for q1l = 1. Summing (18) and (19) implies q1l ≥ q1h. For q1l = q1h (19) also holds
with equality, and the solution is derived in case II. If (19) is slack at the optimum, i.e., q1l > q1h,
then the linearity of the regulator’s objective in q1h implies q1h = 0.
18 The regulator’s payoff becomes
after some manipulation ν (βl + ρ) (S − cl), which increases with βl, so that βl = β̂l (αr) is optimal.
The payoff of the regulator becomes
V ps ≡ ν(S − cl)(β̂l (αr) + ρ) = ν(S − cl)
[
1 + ρ−
(1− ν)(S − ch)
(1− αr)ν∆c
]
.
Standard computations yield V ps ≥ V fs if and only if ν ≥ ν˜ and ρ ≥ ρ ∈ (0, 1].
The second period contract menus {γ2ll, γ2lh} and {γ2hl, γ2hh} follow from Lemma 4. Q.E.D.
Defining
ρ∗ (αc) ≡
(1− ν) (S − ch) (S − cl)
∆c [ν (1− αc)∆c− (1− ν) (S − ch)]
,
18From the first-order condition for q1h we find that q1h = 0 is optimal if and only if βl ≥ β˜
′
l ≡
S−ch+ναr∆c
ν(S−cl)
. Note
that β˜
′
l ≤ β̂l (αr) for ν ≥ ν˜, so that the interval
[
β˜
′
l , β̂l (αr)
]
is non-empty.
24
the following proposition formalizes our result on strategic delegation for 0 < ρ ≤ 1.
Proposition 5 (optimal delegation) Suppose 0 < ρ ≤ 1. For ν > ν∗(αc) and ρ > ρ
∗ (αc) ∈ (0, 1],
Congress strictly benefits from strategic delegation. Optimal delegation assigns the regulator a profit
weight αr = 0, i.e., a pure consumer standard. Otherwise, Congress does not benefit from strategic
delegation and finds it optimal to set a weight αr = αc, implying a regulator with an unbiased welfare
perspective.
Proof of Proposition 5: The proof goes through the following four steps.
Step 1: Suppose ν < ν¯(αc). Then, αr = αc is optimal, because αr = αc induces the regula-
tor to implement the contract in Lemma 3, which coincides with Congress’ optimal long term con-
tract.
Step 2: Suppose ν ≥ ν¯(αc). We show that Congress prefers αr = αc to any αr > αc. To see
this, note first that ρ (.) is strictly increasing in αr. Moreover, ν and ν˜ are also strictly increasing
in αr. Hence, we have either the ordering ν¯(αc) < ν (αr) < ν˜ (αc) < ν˜ (αr) or the ordering ν¯(αc) <
ν˜ (αc) ≤ ν (αr) < ν˜ (αr). Depending on ν ∈ (0, 1), we distinguish the following four cases under the
first ordering:
(i) For ν ∈ [ν¯(αc), ν (αr)) it follows from Proposition 4 that W (αc) −W (αr) = W
fs −W fc =
ν (1 + ρ) (S − cl) + ρ (1− ν) (S − ch) − νρ (1− αr)∆c − (1 + ρ) (S − ch + ναc∆c) ≥ 0, where the in-
equality holds since ν ≥ ν¯(αc).
(ii) For ν ∈ [ν (αr) , ν˜ (αc)) it follows from Proposition 4 that W (αc)−W (αr) = W
fs −W fs = 0.
(iii) For ν ∈ [ν˜ (αc) , ν˜ (αr)) it follows from Proposition 4 that (a) if ρ < ρ (αc), then W (αc) −
W (αr) = W
fs − W fs = 0; (b) if ρ ≥ ρ (αc), then W (αc) − W (αr) = W
ps (αc) − W
fs = ν(S −
cl)
(
βˆl(αc) + ρ
)
− [ν (1 + ρ) (S − cl) + ρ (1− ν) (S − ch)− νρ (1− αr)∆c] ≥ 0, where the inequality
holds since ρ ≥ ρ (αc).
(iv) For ν ≥ ν˜ (αr) it follows from Proposition 4 that (a) if ρ < ρ (αc), then W (αc) −W (αr) =
W fs −W fs = 0; (b) if ρ ∈ [ρ (αc) , ρ (αr)), then W (αc) −W (αr) = W
ps (αc) −W
fs ≥ 0, where the
inequality stems from case (iii(b)); (c) if ρ ≥ ρ (αr), then W (αc)−W (αr) = W
ps (αc)−W
ps (αr) =
ν(S − cl)
(
βˆl(αc) + ρ
)
− ν(S − cl)
(
βˆl(αr) + ρ
)
> 0, where the inequality holds since βˆl(.) is strictly
decreasing.
The second ordering yields the following four cases:
(v) For ν ∈ [ν¯(αc), ν˜ (αc)) it follows from case (i) that W (αc)−W (αr) = W
fs −W fc ≥ 0.
(vi) For ν ∈ [ν˜ (αc) , ν (αr)) it follows from Proposition 4 that (a) if ρ < ρ (αc), then W (αc) −
W (αr) = W
fs −W fc ≥ 0, where the inequality stems from case (i); (b) if ρ ≥ ρ (αc), then W (αc)−
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W (αr) = W
ps(αc)−W
fc = ν(S−cl)
(
βˆl(αc) + ρ
)
−(1 + ρ) (S − ch + ναc∆c) > 0, where the inequality
holds since ν ≥ ν˜(αc).
(vii) For ν ∈ [ν (αr) , ν˜ (αr)) it follows from Proposition 4 that (a) if ρ < ρ (αc), then W (αc) −
W (αr) = W
fs −W fs = 0; (b) if ρ ≥ ρ (αc), then W (αc)−W (αr) = W
ps(αc)−W
fs ≥ 0, where the
inequality stems from case (iii(b)).
(viii) For ν ≥ ν˜ (αr) it follows from case (iv) that W (αc)−W (αr) ≥ 0.
Step 3: If ν > ν∗ (αc) and ρ > ρ
∗ (αc), Congress strictly prefers αr = 0 to αr = αc. Otherwise,
Congress prefers αr = αc to αr = 0. To see this, note first that we have either the ordering ν¯(0) <
ν¯(αc) < ν˜ (0) < ν˜ (αc) or the ordering ν¯(0) < ν˜ (0) ≤ ν (αc) < ν˜ (αc). The first ordering reduces to
ν¯(αc) < ν˜ (0) < ν˜ (αc) and the second ordering reduces to ν (αc) < ν˜ (αc) since Step 1 implies that
Congress finds it optimal to set αr = αc for ν < ν¯(αc). Depending on ν ∈ (0, 1), we distinguish the
following three cases under the first ordering:
(ix) For ν ∈ [ν¯(αc), ν˜ (0)) it follows from Proposition 4 that W (0)−W (αc) = W
fs −W fs = 0.
(x) For ν ∈ [ν˜ (0) , ν˜ (αc)) it follows from Proposition 4 that (a) if ρ < ρ (0), then W (0)−W (αc) =
W fs −W fs = 0; (b) if ρ ≥ ρ (0), then W (0) −W (αc) = W
ps (0) −W fs = ν(S − cl)
(
βˆl(0) + ρ
)
−
[ν (1 + ρ) (S − cl) + ρ (1− ν) (S − ch)− νρ (1− αr)∆c] > 0 if and only if ρ > ρ
∗ (αc) with ρ
∗ (αc) ∈
[ρ (0) , 1] for ν ≥ ν∗ (αc) ∈ (ν˜ (0) , ν˜ (αc)).
(xi) For ν ≥ ν˜ (αc) it follows from Proposition 4 that (a) if ρ < ρ (0), then W (0) −W (αc) =
W fs −W fs = 0; (b) if ρ ∈ [ρ (0) , ρ (αc)), then W (0) −W (αc) = W
ps (0) −W fs > 0 if and only if
ρ > ρ∗ (αc) with ρ
∗ (αc) ∈ [ρ (0) , ρ (αc)), where the inequality stems from case (x(b)); (c) if ρ ≥ ρ (αc),
then W (0)−W (αc) = W
ps (0)−W ps (αc) = ν(S−cl)
(
βˆl(0) + ρ
)
−ν(S−cl)
(
βˆl(αc) + ρ
)
> 0, where
the inequality holds since βˆl(.) is strictly decreasing.
The second ordering yields the following two cases:
(xii) For ν ∈ [ν (αc) , ν˜ (αc)) it follows from case (x) that W (0) − W (αc) > 0 if and only if
ρ > ρ∗ (αc) with ρ
∗ (αc) ∈ [ρ (0) , 1] for ν ≥ ν
∗ (αc) ∈ (ν (αc) , ν˜ (αc)).
(xiii) For ν ≥ ν˜ (αc) it follows from case (xi) that W (0)−W (αc) > 0 if and only if ρ > ρ
∗ (αc).
Step 4: Congress prefers either αr = 0 or αr = αc to any αr ∈ (0, αc) . To see this, substitute
αr = 0 with αr ∈ (0, αc) in the Step 3. This reduces welfare in cases (x(b)), (xi(b)) and (xi(c)), or
(xii) and (xiii), since W ps decreases in αr, while it does not affect welfare in all other cases.
The result in Proposition 5 follows from combining Steps 1, 2, 3, 4. Q.E.D.
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